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Abstract
This paper shows that local labor markets in the U.S. differ substantially and per-
sistently in rates of population turnover. This fact cannot be easily explained by
demographics, sectoral composition, or network centrality. Repeat migration accounts
for a small fraction of the heterogeneity, and natives are more likely to exit mobile
locations than immobile locations. Hence, there is a strong place component to migra-
tion propensity. The paper explores local labor market attributes that might account
for higher mobility rates. There is evidence that mobile locations have more disperse
and volatile income processes, but offer superior rates of human capital accumulation.
JEL codes: R23, J61
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1 Introduction
The typical economic intuition on population migration is households leaving undesirable
regions for more desirable ones. This neatly fits into models of utility maximization and
spatial equilibrium (e.g. Roback (1982)), as the mobility of agents (or the potential thereof)
arbitrages away spatial differences in utility. This is a notion of net migration–the desirable
location gaining population at the expense of the undesirable, until congestion effects or other
prices make the marginal mover indifferent. The dominant empirical feature of population
migration, however, is that gross flows dominate net flows by an order of magnitude. Hence,
gross or “excess” migration is the very means by which population reallocation occurs.1
Though the importance of gross migration was recognized as early as Ravenstein (1885) in
U.K. data and discussed in the U.S. context by Sjaastad (1962), it has received less attention
in the literature than one might expect given that population reallocation is a core topic of
spatial economics and regional science.2
Perhaps the mere existence of excess turnover may not be of compelling research interest
by itself, since there are always plenty of idiosyncrasies among households.3 Potentially more
consequential for regional economic analysis is that local labor markets exhibit persistent
heterogeneity in their degrees of population turnover. That is, some locations are charac-
terized by high mobility, both in- and out, and others have persistently low mobility. Even
studies incorporating gross migration flows typically abstract from spatial heterogeneity.4
Determining what differentiates mobile and immobile labor markets, and whether the
1Excess turnover was termed “migration efficiency” in an earlier literature in sociology (Galle and Williams
(1972)).
2Notable exceptions include empirical analyses in Miller (1973) and Tabuchi (1985) and regional popula-
tion models of gross flows in Schachter and Althaus (1989), Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012), Davis et al.
(2013), Mangum (2015), and Monras (2015).
3Many other forms of labor market transitions are characterized by gross flows in large excess of net flows.
Examples include employment states (Blanchard et al. (1990)), jobs among firms (Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992), Davis et al. (2006)), and workers between firms (Fallick and Fleischman (2004), Davis et al. (2006)).
4Coen-Pirani (2010) documented the correlation of inflow and outflow rates across U.S. states, and this
paper expands the analysis in several dimensions. Notably, this paper shows that the mechanism suggested in
Coen-Pirani (2010), while relevant, is not quantitatively sufficient to explain the wide degree of heterogeneity
between labor markets, as elaborated below.
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factors are causal or incidental, is important for our understanding of local labor market
dynamics. Local labor markets can provide laboratories for studying the labor market at
large, as differences between places impose variation on worker outcomes. Examples of
technique include studies of the labor market implications of location size (Glaeser and
Mare´ (2001), Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012), Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013), Baum-Snow
et al. (2014)), density (Bleakley and Lin (2012)), or sectoral composition (Beaudry et al.
(2012)). More directly, knowing how population reallocates between places–and whether
and how this differs across space–will inform our understanding of adjustment to local labor
market shocks, in the spirt of Blanchard and Katz (1992).
This paper makes three empirical contributions in documenting a set of facts on local
labor market mobility. First, it confirms a large degree of correlation between inflows to and
outflows from local labor markets and establishes that some labor markets are persistently
more mobile than others over long horizons.5 The pattern is documented in several data
sources. Second, the paper shows that compositional differences in population attributes (for
example, in age and education) or in distance from other markets (in physical and in sectoral
space) explain relatively little of the spatial heterogeneity in turnover rates. Moreover, the
incidence of “repeat mobility,” or households who have moved in the past being more likely
to move again,6 accounts for only a fraction of the spatial heterogeneity, and natives to
mobile locations are more likely to migrate away than natives in less mobile places.
Thus, there is a place component to mobility. These descriptive exercises present the lit-
erature with a puzzle, and the paper’s third contribution is to begin offering an explanation.
This is not the sort of question for which there are obvious natural experiments, but some
hypotheses can be tested more heuristically through cuts of the data. The paper offers sev-
eral tests, focusing on differences in income distributions. First, mobility is correlated with
income inequality in both raw and residual (i.e. controlling for individual characteristics)
5In most cases herein, local labor markets are defined as metropolitan areas.
6For the purposes here, it only matters that repeat migration can occur, and it is not important whether
the repeat mobility is “return” (back to a previous location) or “onward” (to a new one), or whether repeat
mobility is caused by an initial move or simply due to selection of households types.
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measurements. This feature is not imposed by the migrants, but is also present when com-
paring the earnings distribution of natives and non-movers as well. Furthermore, migrants to
and from mobile locations have more volatile income processes pre- and post-move than do
migrants to and from less mobile locations. These facts suggest mobile labor markets have
more uncertain distributions of income match quality, which could plausibly cause higher
rates of inflow and outflows simultaneously.
Secondly, mobility is not obviously related to local mean incomes in the spatial cross
section. However, mobile locations do show evidence of superior human capital accumulation.
Earnings accelerate over the life cycle more quickly for workers in mobile places (not just
among the migrants), an effect present even when controlling for market size. Additionally,
migrants’ incomes show a pattern consistent with human capital accumulation, earning at
relative penalties when moving from immobile place to mobile, and retaining wage premia
when migrating from mobile to immobile. Human capital accumulation is also plausibly
related to simultaneous inflow and outflows, making for a more attractive destination while
also allowing incumbent workers to leave without sacrificing all income premia.
This paper intends to spur more research center around spatial heterogeneity in worker
mobility. Mobile locations appear to be fundamentally different labor markets, which offers
an opportunity for studying worker outcomes within markets and population adjustments
between them.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and lays out the basic
empirical facts. Robustness across samples is considered. Section 3 accounts for the role of
repeat mobility. Section 4 then describes the attributes of mobile and immobile places, from
which a few hypotheses emerge. Sections 5 and 6 test for differences in income dynamics
and rates of human capital accumulation. Section 7 concludes. Appendices contain exhibits
with auxiliary results underlying the main analyses.
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2 Empirical Patterns
This paper uses data from a variety of sources, and I briefly describe them before reviewing
the evidence.
2.1 Data
The first source of migration flow data is the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) Statistics of
Income division summary files on county-to-county flows in the U.S. (IRS (2015)). Migration
is inferred by the IRS from year-over-year address changes on a tax filer’s return, and the
IRS makes available a summary of the gross county-to-county flows.7 The data report, for
each place-to-place cell, the number of tax returns (the number of households, to a close ap-
proximation) and the number of exemptions (approximately, the number of persons), and for
each origin and destination county, the total inflows and outflows. I use the household-level
data for 1990-2013, aggregating county-to-county flows to consistent-definition metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs, year 2000).8
The dataset affords several advantages. First, the data contain actual gross flows between
location pairs–i.e., the migration network–for a wide swath of U.S. geography. Second, the
data are reported annually, a high frequency for studies of migration, and reveal migration
patterns over time. Third, the dataset is nearly a census of migration flows, an advantage
over even large microdata samples. However, it is a census of taxpayers only, so those who
earn little income or otherwise do not file taxes are not represented.
The major disadvantage of the data is that it is an aggregation, so there is no information
on the individual households composing the flows. Therefore, I also employ three workhorse
microdata sources provided by the IPUMS project (Ruggles et al. (2015)). I use the five
7The IRS suppresses cells with fewer the 10 households, although the data also include a summary of
total county-level inflows and outflows which include migrants on censored county pairs. For the few of my
analyses that use the full place-to-place flow matrix, the data preparation includes an imputation procedure
for censored observations based on known county inflows and outflows, past and future observed flows for
the county pair, and proximity. The censoring is a more severe problem for flows between rural counties
than among the urban areas that are the focus here.
8For exposition, I exclude cities with a high share of workers in military occupations.
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percent sample of the 2000 decennial census and the 2006-2011 American Community Survey
(ACS), and some ancillary analyses rely on the March Current Population Survey (CPS,
Flood et al. (2015)). The census samples include retrospective questions on MSA and state
of residence five years ago (one year ago in the ACS), which allow observation of one migration
event.9 The Census and ACS data also provide the main sources of information on cross
sectional differences in populations composition and income between locations. Finally, for
some longitudinal analyses, I turn to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID (2014)).
The major advantage is its longitudinal structure, reporting the dynamic path of location
decisions jointly with income. The major disadvantage is its relatively small sample. The
geography available in the PSID is state.
2.2 Correlation in Population Flows
I now turn to the primary descriptives. Figure 1, plot A, displays the initial empirical fact,
the relationship between population inflows and outflows, at the metropolitan level using
the IRS data. The inflow and outflow rates are calculated as a proportion of the start-of-
year population. Clearly, there is a strong correlation between inflows and outflows: cities
that receive migrants send away a remarkably similar magnitude. If the empirical pattern
of migration were one of spatial arbitrage–population leaving bad locations and entering
good locations–this line would have negative slope. With the strong positive correlation,
net migration rates average less than half of a percent, meaning gross flows are an order of
magnitude larger. The most mobile labor markets have three to four times the population
turnover of the least mobile markets.
In a long enough horizon, this pattern could arise if local cycling caused cities to gain
population in some years and lose it in others. Plots B, C, and D shows this is not the
case. Plot B shows the contemporaneous metro-by-year rates of inflow and outlaw, which
9It is possible that a person leaves a state/MSA and returns before five years; this would be coded as
non-migration. Census responses for location may not be the person’s tax address reported to the IRS. This
distinction is apparent in cities with a relatively large share of student population (“college towns”).
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Figure 1: Correlations In Gross Population Flows, 1990-2013
NOTES: Each dot represents a metro area, except in plot B, where a dot is a metro area-year. Source: IRS migration flow raw data.
are nearly as correlated as the averages in plot A. Plots C and D show the persistence in
flows. Plot C shows the average gross outflow from the metro area for the early years of
data (1990-1995) plotted agains the end of the data (2007-2013), and plot D does the same
for inflows. While there is a general decline in mobility over this horizon (see Molloy et al.
(2011) and Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2012)), the persistence in spatial heterogeneity is
strong. Rank correlations are about 0.95.
2.3 Robustness
The rest of the paper is devoted to unpacking why some locations are persistently more
mobile than others. But before proceeding, some initial robustness checks are in order.
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Table 1 reports on mobility measures from across samples and compares raw mobility rates
with indices that control for some potential explanations for the spatial heterogeneity in
mobility.
2.3.1 Network Distance
One explanation is that certain locations are more centrally placed in space and might be
more accessible than remote areas. Network centrality could apply to physical space as
well as “similarities,” broadly defined, including sectoral composition of the labor market.
An easy way to test for this is through the well-known gravity model of migration.10 The
regression model is
mjkt = θ0 + θ1sj + θ2sk + f(Djk) + αjXjt + βkXkt + dt + dj + dk + εjkt (1)
where mjkt is the log flow between origin i and destination j in year t, θ1, θ2 account for
market size, f(Dij) is a pairwise (origin-destination) function of distance, Xj, Xk are origin
and destination attributes, and dj, dk are original and estimation fixed effects. dt is a time
dummy to account for trends in migration nationally.
The IRS migration data provide the full matrix of gross place-to-place flows and are
therefore best suited for a gravity model using pairwise measures of distance. The objects
of interest here are the origin and destination fixed effects, as these recover the average out-
and in-mobility unexplained by network distance. Table 1 reports the correlations between
several specifications, with panels read as a matrix. The diagonal of a panel contains the
correlations between origin and destination index for each specification. The lower triangle
is the correlation between specifications in the origin mobility index; for example, between
the raw outflow and a gravity adjusted origin fixed effect. The upper triangle does the same
for the destination side.
10The gravity equation is a common tool for measuring migration elasticities; see Greenwood (1975). Its
microfoundations from utility theory are developed by Niedercorn and Bechdolt (1969).
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Table 1: Correlation Within and Between Alternate Mobility Indices
Legend Correlation Reported:
Index 1 Index 2
Index 1 Orig 1, Dest 1 Dest 1, Dest 2
Index 2 Orig 2, Orig 1 Orig 2, Dest 2
Index No. IRS
Index/Index Raw Gravity Gravity+LM Log Rate I.H.S.
1 Raw 0.907 0.592 0.618 0.592 0.484
2 Gravity 0.723 0.842 0.994 1.000 0.870
3 Gravity+LM 0.665 0.978 0.848 0.994 0.847
4 Log Rate 0.695 0.920 0.857 0.637 0.870
5 I.H.S. 0.427 0.689 0.733 0.370 0.983
Census 2000
Raw Demographics Demo.+Moved In Non-college College
6 Raw 0.766 0.325 0.331 0.276
7 Demographics 0.818 0.622 0.983 0.909
8 Demo.+Moved In 0.834 0.931
9 Non-college 0.766 0.973 0.880 0.626 0.826
10 College 0.807 0.869 0.884 0.796 0.466
ACS
Raw Demographics Demo.+Moved In Non-college College
11 Raw 0.487 0.990 0.973 0.855
12 Demographics 0.954 0.740 0.980 0.878
13 Demo.+Moved In 0.932 0.965
14 Non-college 0.908 0.970 0.912 0.742 0.773
15 College 0.793 0.873 0.881 0.757 0.515
Correlations Between Indices, Origin Side
Index/Index 1 3 7 8 12
1 1.000
3 0.728 1.000
7 0.730 0.594 1.000
8 0.618 0.408 0.930 1.000
12 0.812 0.472 0.777 0.739 1.000
NOTES: Indices are specifications of models (1) and (2). Select indices are reported in Table B1. Additional results from the models are reported
in Table A1 and A2. Origin indices are in rows and destination indices in columns; see the legend for the structure of reporting correlation
coefficients between index type. There are 272 metro areas in the IRS data, 239 in the 2000 Census, and 263 in the ACS. Source: Author’s
calculations using IRS, Census, and ACS data as described in main text.
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The table focuses on the relationships between indices, but the underlying regression
results are in Appendix Table A1, and I also briefly discuss these. Index 2 introduces a
linear-in-parameters distance function of f(Dij) including the physical distance between
metro areas in log miles, and three measures of labor market similarity, the difference in
college attainment rates, the difference in market population sizes, and a sum of differences
in the employment share by industry (by NAICS category). All of these enter negatively,
meaning differences between metro areas are associated with less migration flow (in either
direction) between the pair. Empirically, the log miles term is most important. This is
because most migration is regional, with 60 percent of between-metro migrants staying within
census division and 70 percent within census region. But the distance function does not
reduce the variance across the location fixed effects, and the correlation of the origin fixed
effect with the raw out rate is 0.72, meaning the gravity adjustment does little to change the
rank correlations–mobile locations are still mobile controlling for distance, broadly defined,
so some other forces are at work.11 (Index 2 is reported for the full set of metro areas in
Appendix Table B1.)
Index 3 accounts for cyclical and long term labor market trends by including measures of
the local unemployment rate, wages, and residential costs. Each of these has the expected
sign as “attractor” or “repellant” to population. Finally, indices 4 and 5 are specification
checks, the former fixing θi = 1, so that outflows is measured as a rate, and the latter using
the inverse hyperbolic sine instead of the log so that pairwise flows of zero can be included
in the regression. But throughout the IRS panel of Table 1, correlations are positive and
large. Reading down the diagonal, it is clear that distance and local labor market controls
do little to break the correlation between inflows and outflows. Comparing indices with the
raw rates and each other shows that various specifications of a gravity model do not change
the rank pattern of spatial heterogeneity. Hence, a basic gravity explanation is unsatisfying.
11In many cases, actually, gravity fails to explain why so many coastal markets (especially west coast),
which are remote by construction, are highly mobile. See Table B1.
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2.3.2 Compositional Differences
A second explanation is demographic. Mobile locations might simply have more population
share in typically mobile groups–the young, the college educated, the single, etc. Such an
“explanation” only pivots the question, in a sense, from understanding spatial heterogeneity
in mobility to heterogeneity in attractiveness or production of certain types of groups, and
moreover, why these places might be “layover” cities, attracting disproportionate share of
migrants that are soon to leave. Regardless, I actually find a limited role for demographic
explanations, meaning there is a large degree of residual spatial heterogeneity.
To address questions of individual characteristics, I turn to the census microdata sources.
To form indices of out and in-mobility from microdata, I run regressions of
I(moveij) = βXi + dj + εi (2)
where I(moveij) is an indicator variable for whether the individual migrated from origin j
according to the retrospective question, Xi is a vector of individual attributes and dj is the
location fixed effect of interest. I control for age-by-education categories, race, immigrant
status, and household composition, limiting the sample to working age adults not enrolled
in school.12 I do this for the origin and destination side since the census offers information
on last (origin) and current (destination) location of residence. The coefficients for the
attributes are reported in Appendix Table A2, but there is nothing surprising, so I do not
discuss.
Index 7 of Table 1 uses the demographic controls on 2000 census data (five year migration
rate) and index 12 on ACS data (one year rate). Each of these indices are still highly
correlated with the raw outflow rate. The destination side is also correlated, though to
a lower extent. Monras (2015) shows that population inflows are more sensitive to local
12The respondents may have been enrolled in school in the year or five years prior, at their previous
location. Inspection of the data reveals that several well-known “college towns” (e.g. Bloomington, IN,
Athens, GA, College Station, TX) have inordinate amounts of migration in the census data. I account for
college towns by including a measure of the share of adults enrolled in college or in the education profession.
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labor market conditions than are outflows; for example, bad labor markets do not send more
migrants than usual, but they attract many fewer in-migrants. Thus, in general, we should
expect origin indices to be more persistent and more similar across specifications. Hence, I
use origin indices as my preferred measures of local migration rates, especially when the full
matrix of flows is not available.
Indices 8 and 13 add one more important modification–a control for whether the respon-
dent was “at home,” that is, residing in their state of birth, in the origin location. Thus, if
a location appears to be mobile because it has a lot of transplant residents who are likely
to move on again, this index would account for the non-natives living there. (By definition,
there is no destination equivalent of this specification.) The correlation with the raw index
remains, and the correlation between it and the demographics-only index is very high. Thus,
spatial heterogeneity in mobility rates is apparent even after controlling for a location’s his-
tory of in-migrants. This is a key result, and I will return to the repeat mobility issue in
more depth in the next section.
Finally, indices 9 and 10 (14 and 15 for ACS) split the sample into non-college educated
and college educated workers, who may face different labor market opportunities. Mobile
locations are similarly mobile for both sets of workers, especially on the origin side. One
interesting aside, however, is the relatively low correlation for in- and outflow rates among
the college educated, which could be due to the ongoing concentration of educated workers in
certain locations (Moretti (2013), Ganong and Shoag (2013), Broxterman and Yezer (2015),
Diamond (2016)).
The bottom panel of the table reports the correlations in the origin side indices across
specifications. Cities are measured to be similarly mobile across datasets with different
structures, timelines, and forms of reporting.13 The patterns are robust to controls for
network distance or demographic explanations. So then, what makes a mobile location?
13The lowest across-index correlations involve the gravity adjusted IRS index, which assigns slightly higher
values to coastal locations.
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3 Repeat Mobility
As alluded to earlier, one possible mechanism is that a location is mobile because it was
mobile before. That is, if “repeat mobility” is common, locations with a larger share of non-
native residents will exhibit more turnover as a consequence of their transient composition.14
The literature has long recognized that movers are likely to move again, whether “return”
(to a previous location) or “onward” (to a never-visited location) (Herzog and Schlottmann
(1982), DaVanzo (1983), Kennan and Walker (2011)).
Repeat mobility is the chief mechanism by which Coen-Pirani (2010) generates correlation
in gross inflows and outflows. In that paper’s model, new arrivals to a location are more
likely to find themselves mismatched, and therefore more likely to move away. Long time
residents, on the other hand, are a selected sample of those positively matched. When paired
with persistent productivity shocks, growing locations will have more in- and out-mobility
than the average location. Indeed, the mobile locations tend to be growing in population.
For example, the correlation in population growth and the gravity adjusted index is 0.49.
Perhaps mobile places are simply attractive to in-migrants, many of whom turn around and
leave again, and that is sufficient explanation.
The data indicate there is more to the story than repeat mobility alone. While I concur
with the existing literature that one-time migrants are more likely to move again, this is
insufficient explanation for the marked spatial heterogeneity between local labor markets. I
investigate this empirically by estimating versions of the following equation.
Pr(move) = βX+α1orig mobility+α2I(not at home)+α3orig mobility×I(not at home)+
(3)
where orig mobility is an origin’s mobility index and I(not at home) is an indicator for
whether the individual had migrated in to that origin from elsewhere. If repeat mobility
14I use “native” to refer to region of birth domestically, not status as an immigrant from a foreign country.
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explains spatial heterogeneity, including this term will drive the mobility index coefficient
toward zero. The interaction then measures whether in-migrants are more or less likely to
move out of mobile places than immobile.
In the census data, “not at home” is indicated by whether the person was in a location
other than his birth state. For example, a California-born resident of Los Angeles is “at
home,” but those born outside of California are not.15 Unfortunately, the data do not
indicate when an out-of-state born person moved in (whether as a child or working age
adult) or how many moves occurred prior, but this forms the best available measure relevant
for the fundamental idea–that transplants are more likely to leave. The longitudinal structure
of the PSID allows me to separately control for whether the origin is “home” (the place of
residence in childhood) and whether the respondent moved in from elsewhere, though the
spatial detail is limited to states.
Notice that by controlling generically for transplant status, specification (3) accounts for
many factors that might underlie repeat mobility and focuses on the effect of it on spatial
heterogeneity in mobility rates. It is agnostic as to whether subsequent moves for transplants
are more likely because of a causal force–e.g. people are more likely to dislike a new place
than a familiar one–or mere selection of people with idiosyncratically low moving costs. The
point of emphasis is what happens to the origin mobility index coefficient.
Table 2 reports the results for several samples. In all cases, I use indices of origin mobility
from out of sample. Columns 1 and 2 report results for census data, using the IRS-based
gravity adjusted index and the ACS index, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 use the ACS index,
but separately for the non-college and college educated sample. Column 5 is ACS data using
a census index, and Column 6 is PSID using an IRS index.
Model 1 controls for individual attributes besides transplant status. In all cases, the
mobility index is positively associated with an individual’s migration probability. At these
coefficient sizes, a standard deviation increase in the origin’s mobility rate leads to an increase
15For metros crossing state lines, any state of birth in the metro area is considered at home (e.g. New
Jersey-born New York MSA residents are natives).
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Table 2: Regressions of Mobility Controlling for Transplant Status
Spec: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dataset Census Census Census Census ACS PSID
Index Source IRS ACS ACS ACS Census IRS
Sample All All Non-college College All All
Model 1
Mobility Index 0.0307 0.0332 0.0315 0.0448 0.0068 0.00012
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0000)*** (0.00001)***
Model 2
Mobility Index 0.0263 0.0246 0.0227 0.0364 0.0060 0.00007
(0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0001)*** (0.00001)***
Not at home 0.0816 0.0868 0.0764 0.1092 0.0206 0.14656
(0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0001)*** (0.00222)***
Moved in 0.10936
(0.00200)***
Moved In X
Mobility Index -0.009 0.0065 0.0069 0.0083 -0.000 0.00007
(0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0001)*** (0.00002)***
Mean Mobility Rate
All 0.0995 0.0995 0.0809 0.1467 0.0244 0.0467
At Home 0.0655 0.0655 0.0545 0.0998 0.0169 0.0206
Not at home 0.1368 0.1368 0.1117 0.1842 0.0319 0.1425
N 4,201,166 4,149,912 3,022,319 1,192,093 5,787,886 96,333
NOTES: The table reports regression results in form of model (3). “At home” is defined as residing in metro area in the state of one’s birth; this
can be distinguished from a recent move in the PSID only. All models include controls for age by education, household structure, race and
nativity. Census and ACS data control for the metro area’s share of college students. ACS includes year dummies. Source: Author’s calculations
using IRS, Census, ACS, and PSID data as described in main text.
of 30% in the individual’s migration probability. Model 2 introduces the control for transplant
status, but this only reduces the index coefficients to a 24-26 percent effect. Thus, even
controlling for incumbency, mobile places are still substantially more likely to send away
migrants. Moreover, a positive interaction term indicates that transplants are actually even
more likely to re-migrate out of mobile places than immobile, although the sign of the
interaction is not robust across samples and index choices.
A simple back-of-the-envelope exercise helps to quantify the role of repeat mobility in
explaining spatial heterogeneity. From column 1 of Table 2, transplants are 8.1 percentage
points more likely to move than those already residing in their place of birth. If mobility
rates were the same everywhere, and locations varied only in the share of transplants, then
the difference between two locations k, j in mobility rates would be 0.081 · (sk − sj) where
s is the share of natives/non-transplants. In the data, the 90-10 percentile gap in mobility
rates between cities is 13 percentage points, meaning the transplant shares would have to
differ by an impossible 160 percentage points. Besides, such a projection would assume a
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perfect rank correlation between observed mobility rate and transplant share, which is not
the case. Using demographics and transplant share to predict migration rates by city via
the regressions of (3), the 90-10 difference in predicted rate is just 6 percentage points, less
than half the actual gap. In an average across cities, observed demographics and transplant
status can explain only one-third of the local deviation from mean migration rate. Clearly,
there remains a significant place-based component to migration rates even after controlling
for the tendencies and attributes of repeat migrants.
4 Local Labor Market Characteristics
If there is a place component to migration probability, what are the attributes of mobile
places? There could, of course, be many and varied reasons across cities. This paper is
intended, in part, to stimulate work on this pattern, and cannot itself find every explanation.
However, local labor market characteristics, subject of a long and useful tradition of research
in regional studies, are a good place to start. In particular, I will describe the relationship
between local income distributions and mobility rates. There are three reasons for focusing
on income distributions. First, income distributions are the most prominent features of local
labor markets besides sectoral composition, and differences in local sectoral composition are
not obviously driving heterogeneity in mobility, which persisted even after controlling for
sectoral isolation (in the gravity models) and composition of worker types (in the census
microdata).16 Second, an important strand of literature in local labor markets concerns
the relationship between city size and average earnings or dispersion in earnings ((Glaeser
and Mare´ (2001), Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012), Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013), Baum-
Snow et al. (2014)), so it seems natural to extend these questions to another feature of
persistent heterogeneity in local labor markets. In essence, this is another way to use local
labor markets as a “laboratory” for studying the aggregate labor market. Finally, there are
16Also, Coen-Pirani (2010) found previously that inflows and outflows from local labor markets contained
observationally similar workers, further suggesting that compositional changes are not driving the turnover.
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plausible reasons to believe that the differences in income distributions could actually be
causing the in- and out-mobility and are not merely coincidental, though the particulars of
this conjecture will be elaborated in more detail after observing patterns in the data.
As an initial exploration, Table 3 examines whether mobility is correlated with features
of local income distributions. The columns report the correlation of the various metro level
mobility indices with the rows of local income statistics. The top panel focuses on means
and the bottom panels on dispersion. Measures of earnings come from the 2000 decennial
census, although results using the 1990 census and the ACS are quite similar. In each panel,
there is a calculation using the raw data as well as the residuals from Mincer-style regressions
that control for education, experience, work hours, demographics like race and family status,
and industry and occupational classifications (at the two digit level, with about two dozen
categories each). Using the residuals allows for the study of peculiar place-based components
after accounting for obvious compositional differences.
I being with mean earnings. The top row shows that more mobile locations have on
average slightly lower earnings. However, the row using residual incomes (i.e. the city fixed
effect) shows that this might be compositional, since mobile places offer higher residual
incomes in at least some measures of income mobility. The next six rows split out the
calculation of raw and residual means by migrant-type subsamples: workers at home (their
birth location, regardless of whether they have ever moved), non-migrants (workers who were
in the same labor market five years prior), and migrants (new entrants in the last five years).
The correlations among incumbent residents are very similar to the full sample, suggesting
the patterns are inherent in the locations themselves and are not driven by having disparate
shares of transplants.
How might higher incomes be associated with more in- and out-mobility? If a local labor
market offered higher incomes because of locally-specific productivity, it would be plausible
that this would attract in-migrants, though there is no obvious reason why it would also
propel out-migrants. Besides, income differentials of this nature should be arbitraged away
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in steady-state equilibrium through net migration and the adjustment of other local prices.
Thus, there need be no pattern between and mobility and average earnings stemming from
locally-specific productivity. However, there is an alternative theory relating average earnings
to mobility: if a local labor market offered more substantial human capital accumulation, this
could at once attract in-migrants and allow out-migration by permitting individuals to carry
some of their income premium along with them upon moving. Human capital accumulation
could also fail to show up as a persistent income premium in the cross section, with different
people coming and going from the local market at different points of human capital stock,
which would be consistent with the weak to negative correlations in Table 3. Thus, human
capital augmentation seems a viable candidate for causing higher turnover. Section 6 below
will look for evidence of faster human capital accumulation among higher mobility cities.
The lower panel of Table 3 displays the correlations between local income dispersion
and the mobility indices. Income dispersion is strongly correlated with mobility, and high
turnover locations tend to have wider (i.e. more unequal) income distributions. This is
evident in several typical measures of dispersion. The pattern holds above the median (90-
50 percentile), but stronger still below it (50-10 percentile), though it is not driven by points
farther out to the tails (99-01, 99-50 and 50-01). This suggests the mobile locations have
dispersion throughout the mass of the working population, and not excessively high or low
earners.
The bottommost panel shows the pattern is largely unchanged when using residual in-
comes. That is, mobile places tend to have a wide dispersion of income for unobserved
reasons, not because of, say, a wide diversity of occupations or worker education. This is
consistent with the notion that there is a place component to turnover not due to sectoral
composition.
Why might income dispersion be relevant for turnover? It is a reasonable candidate for
driving both in and out-mobility to the extent it comes from “match quality.” If earnings
outcomes are subject to idiosyncratic match quality, workers of similar observable type would
18
be passing each other in and out of the city, good matches flowing in and bad matches
flowing out. This is similar intuition to Coen-Pirani (2010), but not limited to new entrants.
Furthermore, uncertainty about a match could also incentivize experimental migration by
offering a higher option value–a worker would want to try the high variance market, and if
it does not work out, he can try again elsewhere or go home again. Thus, places with high
variance in incomes for any host of reasons might exhibit more mobility in and out, even
driving out incumbents.
The evidence is consistent with dispersion in match distribution. Importantly, the corre-
lation of mobility with income dispersion remains when splitting the income data by subsam-
ples of non-migrants and workers born in the location, indicating that the dispersion comes
from a local data generating process and is not imposed by having a large share of trans-
plants. This is especially important point for considering income dispersion, since migrants
could otherwise cause local income dispersion simply by having fewer income draws to “settle
in” to the location. When the mobile places exhibit higher variance even among incumbents,
it suggests they have a more disperse, uncertain primitive income match distribution.
In summary, mobile places do not necessarily offer higher or lower earnings on average,
though the distribution of incomes is more disperse, even when controlling for a wide array
of worker characteristics. Next, I investigate whether disperse match quality means more
individual earnings uncertainty. Then I test the conjecture that mobile places offer superior
human capital accumulation.
5 Income Uncertainty
Conceptually, a wide dispersion of match quality could obtain without individual uncertainty.
That is, mobile locations may consistently offer the individuals incomes that are disperse in
the cross section. This could generate out mobility as suggested above. However, mobility
could be more greatly affected if the dispersion was also associated with greater temporal
19
Table 3: Correlation Between Local Income Distribution Characteristics and Mobility Indices
1 2 3 4
Index: IRS IRS Census Census
Income Raw Gravity Adj. Raw Demog. Adj.
Data Stat Sample
Raw Mean All -0.273 -0.154 -0.133 -0.354
Residual Mean All 0.175 0.184 -0.105 -0.089
Raw Mean At-home -0.398 -0.311 -0.262 -0.471
Mean Non-Migrants -0.223 -0.135 -0.046 -0.308
Mean Migrants -0.418 -0.169 -0.449 -0.429
Residual Mean At-home 0.266 0.243 -0.019 0.003
Mean Non-Migrants 0.215 0.201 -0.055 -0.046
Mean Migrants 0.252 0.212 0.038 0.001
Raw StdDev All 0.568 0.487 0.510 0.482
90-10 All 0.562 0.509 0.480 0.460
99-01 All 0.375 0.287 0.427 0.388
90-50 All 0.423 0.392 0.278 0.266
99-50 All 0.178 0.158 0.168 0.266
50-10 All 0.606 0.500 0.539 0.515
50-01 All 0.372 0.258 0.429 0.311
StdDev At-home 0.542 0.522 0.457 0.466
StdDev Non-Migrants 0.532 0.485 0.406 0.448
StdDev Migrants 0.288 0.210 0.508 0.237
Residual StdDev All 0.467 0.530 0.276 0.342
90-10 All 0.467 0.523 0.274 0.366
99-01 All 0.439 0.491 0.253 0.269
90-50 All 0.400 0.486 0.243 0.291
99-50 All 0.406 0.461 0.253 0.285
50-10 All 0.415 0.422 0.233 0.348
50-01 All 0.274 0.299 0.141 0.135
StdDev At-home 0.369 0.433 0.240 0.318
StdDev Non-Migrants 0.426 0.531 0.212 0.313
StdDev Migrants 0.280 0.242 0.245 0.174
NOTES: The table reports correlation coefficients between in the metro area cross section the income distribution statistic (rows) and the
mobility index (columns). Metro area index values are reported in Table B1. There are 240 metro areas with mobility indices and income data
available. Source: Author’s calculations using IRS, Census, and ACS data as described in main text.
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shocks to an individual’s earnings. One way to test for this second layer is to measure whether
migration events in and out of mobile places are associated with larger income shocks than
those in to or out of immobile places.
To look at earnings dynamics, I turn to the longitudinal PSID. As before, I want to con-
dition on observable characteristics (which may themselves be subject to trends and shocks)
and focus on an otherwise unexplained place component. For each person-year observation, I
use the annual March CPS to predict that person’s income given their experience, education,
race, occupation, industry, and location in the year of observation t. Then I look at residuals
from this prediction over time, yeit ≡ yit − yˆit, in a regression of the following form:
yeit =
T∑
s=1
I(move)[δorigin mobilityt−s + δ
destination mobility
t+s ] + νit (4)
where I(move) is an indicator for a migration event and the δ’s are parameters of interest
measuring the mean residual income s periods before and after the move event (at s = 0).
These are measured relative to a non-migrating individual, and I am mainly interested in
dynamics over δs.
17 To maintain consistency over time in the PSID, the periods are two-year
intervals, and I use four observations on each side of the move (so, eight years before and
after). For exposition, I split the locations into the more mobile and less mobile halves.
The coefficients are displayed in Figure 2 and reported with standard errors in Appendix
Table A3. On the origin side of the migration event, workers out of mobile places are
experiencing relative declines in income (from a statistically significant ten log point premium
to zero). Workers out of immobile places exhibit much flatter profiles, not significant from
zero. On the destination side, incomes for movers improve over time, but much more quickly
for those arriving in mobile destinations.18 Taken together, it appears that mobile locations
are not only more disperse in the cross-section, but also produce more volatile individual
income dynamics. Both of these are centered around a move event, so the patterns suggest
17If migrants on average have higher or lower earnings, this would be swept out by the constant.
18The dynamic pattern remains when splitting the destination into return and new (to the individual)
locations.
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Figure 2: Earnings Dynamics Pre- and Post-Move, by Location Mobility
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NOTES: The figure plots residual log income over time for migrants moving at a normalized time zero, indicated by the vertical line. The model
is (4). Point estimates and standard errors are reported in Table A3. Source: Author’s calculations using PSID, IRS, and CPS data as described
in main text.
that migration from mobile places is more driven by income than migration to or from
immobile places.
6 Human Capital Accumulation
Table 3 showed that city level mobility, in some cases, was correlated with residual income
premia, though never with average incomes. I conjectured that human capital formulation
could be associated with gross in- and out-mobility and fail to show up in a cross sectional
correlation of mobility to incomes. I explore this conjecture further in this section. My
approach to testing for superior human capital formation is similar to Glaeser and Mare´
(2001). First, I test whether the income-experience profile varies with mobility rates. Second,
I test whether the earnings outcomes of movers (recent entrants to the local labor market)
are consistent with human capital formation in their origin and destination cities.
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6.1 The Income-Experience Profile
The first test is to measure the income-experience profile in more versus less mobile locations
to look for differences in how earnings grow as the worker gains experience. I use variants
of the regression:
yij = βXi+(1+γ1college)×(γ2experi+γ3exper2i )+
∑
a∈{0:5:25}
γaexper
a,a+4
i ·mobilityj+εij (5)
where exper is implied experience and X is a vector of worker attributes. The first terms
(in parentheses) measure the typical income profile over the life cycle, interacted with col-
lege degree attainment, while controlling for the observed characteristics in X. The terms
γaexper
a,a+4·mobilityj are an interaction of five-year experience categories with the location’s
mobility index. These measure the income profile in higher turnover locations compared to
low turnover.
The results on 2000 Census data are presented in Table 4. All regressions control for
available demographic characteristics, education categories, hours and weeks worked, and
occupational and industry dummies. Column 1 is the basic specification, which includes
dummies for the city’s population size category. The experience-mobility interaction terms
show that more mobile places do not offer higher incomes to young workers, but a substantial
premium emerges at five years and continues through mid-career. For example, a worker with
ten years experience in a city with a one standard deviation higher mobility rate earns about
three percent more than the same worker in an average mobility place. For comparison, a
standard deviation in mobility is worth about one and one-half years experience for a worker
of this age. The premium declines into the late career, though not completely. This profile
is consistent with a worker ascending the experience-earnings profile more rapidly in more
mobile locations, evidence for higher human capital accumulation.
The remaining columns offer robustness checks and measurements of heterogeneity. Col-
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umn 2 adds interactions of experience dummies with log population. This reduces the
experience-mobility interactions by about half, but the profile shape is qualitatively similar.
Thus, some of the evidence for human capital accumulation is confounded with population
size effects, but still the conjecture is not rejected. Column 3 adds MSA fixed effects to soak
up average differences between cities. This requires a dropping of one experience category
and a concomitant change in coefficient interpretation, but does not change the profile.
Columns 4 to 6 confirm that the observed profile is not caused by the migrants themselves,
but appears to be a feature of the data generating process in mobile locations. Column 4,
following Dahl (2002), adds a control function for the likelihood that a worker born in some
location j would reside in their observed location. There is evidence of selection (unlikely
locations are associated with higher earnings), but this does not change the experience-
mobility profile. Column 5 limits the sample to non-migrants, and column 6 to non-migrants
in their birth location. The results are very similar to column 2, strongly suggesting that
the difference in profiles comes has a place component. Finally, columns 7 and 8 split the
sample among the non-college and college educated. The profiles are similar, though slightly
larger for the college educated.
In summary, mobile locations exhibit a steeper income-experience profile, with early to
mid-career workers earning the largest premium relative to similar workers in less mobile
locations.
6.2 Movers Compared to Non-Movers
Continuing to follow the logic of Glaeser and Mare´ (2001), I next use migrants to look
for evidence of superior human capital in mobile locations. Here, I leverage the current
and retrospective locations available in census data, comparing the difference in the two
locations’ mobility rates (though income is only observed in the current place). The logic is
that if mobile locations offer more human capital accumulation, then workers have to gain
experience in the mobile place to obtain a premium. Thus, recent migrants into mobile
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places should earn less if they came from immobile places, since they did not acquire human
capital as quickly in their previous work location. On the other hand, recent migrants to
less mobile locations should earn more if they came from more mobile places. Of course, an
empirical test of this should account for the possible selection of workers to migrant status.
I use versions of the regression:
yij = βXi + f(experi, collegei) + I(moved) ·∆mobilityjk + I(moved) · I(j = home) + εij (6)
where X is a vector of attributes, f(·) is a experience function as in (5), I(moved) indicates
a migrant and ∆mobilityjk indicates the difference in mobility rate between the past and
current location. For simplicity, I will split migrants into those moving “up” (to a higher
mobility place from lower) and “down” (to lower mobility). I also include controls for whether
the current location is a move back to one’s home (birthplace).
Table 5 reports the results. As a first check, column 1 simply includes a dummy for a
migrant and another for a move home. The average migrant exhibits a very slight earnings
disadvantage to an observationally equivalent worker, and moves home–possibly more likely
to be occurring for non-labor market reasons–come at a income cost of about four percent.
Column 2 splits the migrant dummy into moves up and down. Movers up (going from a less
mobile to a more mobile place) exhibit about one percent lower incomes than observationally
equivalent workers, and movers down (from more to less mobile places) earn at just under a
one percent premium. These migrant patterns are consistent with a story of superior human
capital accumulation in mobile cities. Workers entering mobile places earn at a penalty
relative to incumbent workers, though workers exiting mobile places retain a premium in
their new markets.
Column 3 interacts the move up and down dummies with the five-year experience cate-
gories. This is an important test of the conjecture because workers with less than five years
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experience typically were not working in their previous locations, their place of residence
five years ago. Young workers did not accumulate local labor market experience in past
locations, though older workers did. The result shows that young workers in either direction
exhibit premia relative to non-migrating young workers, which could be purely a selection
story. Older workers, in contrast, having accumulated experience in their past location, ex-
hibit penalties and premia consistent with superior human capital accumulation in mobile
places: movers up earn at a penalty, and movers down at a premium, especially around 10-
20 years experience. Columns 4 and 5 split the sample by college education to reveal some
heterogeneity. Non-college educated workers seem most susceptible to the move-up penalty,
while college educated workers reap most of the move-down premium. Perhaps the college
educated are more able to control the circumstances under which they move.
In summary, there is evidence that mobile cities offer opportunity for superior human
capital accumulation, and this could be one reason they are at once attractive to in-migrants
and allow higher rates of out-mobility. This result is robust to and coincident with the
well-established relationship between city size.
7 Conclusion
This paper has highlighted a robust but understudied feature of local labor markets, the
persistent spatial heterogeneity in population turnover. This heterogeneity cannot be easily
explained by demographic or compositional differences, location remoteness (in physical or
sectoral space), or even by the perpetuation of turnover through repeat mobility. The paper
aims to push future lines of research in regional studies, and local labor markets in particular,
by documenting these patterns.
The paper then starts this agenda by suggesting that mobile locations are materially
different local labor markets. In particular, mobile places have more income dispersion,
income volatility, and steeper income-experience profiles. The patterns apply generally to
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Table 5: Earnings Outcomes for Movers
1 2 3 4 5
Sample All All All Non-College College
Migrate - any -0.002
(0.0011)**
Migrate - up mobility -0.011
(0.0015)***
x 0-4 yrs. exp. 0.0170 0.0375 -0.003
(0.0035)*** (0.0051)*** (0.0050)
x 5-9 yrs. exp. -0.024 -0.009 -0.037
(0.0030)*** (0.0045)** (0.0044)***
x 10-14 yrs. exp. -0.006 -0.019 0.0043
(0.0035)* (0.0047)*** (0.0054)
x 15-19 yrs. exp. -0.011 -0.027 0.0069
(0.0039)*** (0.0050)*** (0.0064)
x 20-24 yrs. exp. -0.002 -0.029 0.0344
(0.0044) (0.0054)*** (0.0074)***
x 25-29 yrs. exp. -0.031 -0.049 -0.006
(0.0051)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0085)
x 30+ yrs. exp. -0.032 -0.053 0.0128
(0.0049)*** (0.0056)*** (0.0093)
Migrate - down mobility 0.0083
(0.0016)***
x 0-4 yrs. exp. 0.0377 0.0614 0.0125
(0.0042)*** (0.0058)*** (0.0063)**
x 5-9 yrs. exp. -0.007 0.0046 -0.018
(0.0034)** (0.0047) (0.0051)***
x 10-14 yrs. exp. 0.0115 0.0039 0.0191
(0.0037)*** (0.0049) (0.0059)***
x 15-19 yrs. exp. 0.0128 -0.004 0.0346
(0.0041)*** (0.0051) (0.0069)***
x 20-24 yrs. exp. 0.0002 -0.009 0.0155
(0.0046) (0.0056)* (0.0080)*
x 25-29 yrs. exp. 0.0117 -0.008 0.0430
(0.0054)** (0.0067) (0.0092)***
x 30+ yrs. exp. -0.000 -0.020 0.0452
(0.0053) (0.0059)*** (0.0104)***
Moved Home -0.040 -0.042
(0.0032)*** (0.0032)***
x 0-4 yrs. exp. -0.018 -0.011 -0.020
(0.0083)** (0.0125) (0.0115)*
x 5-9 yrs. exp. -0.032 -0.042 -0.023
(0.0063)*** (0.0088)*** (0.0093)**
x 10-14 yrs. exp. -0.052 -0.053 -0.048
(0.0074)*** (0.0098)*** (0.0115)***
x 15-19 yrs. exp. -0.036 -0.041 -0.032
(0.0085)*** (0.0105)*** (0.0141)**
x 20-24 yrs. exp. -0.059 -0.054 -0.062
(0.0100)*** (0.0121)*** (0.0172)***
x 25-29 yrs. exp. -0.079 -0.082 -0.073
(0.0117)*** (0.0141)*** (0.0206)***
x 30+ yrs. exp. -0.046 -0.029 -0.083
(0.0114)*** (0.0128)** (0.0230)***
N 2,467,207 2,467,207 2,467,207 1,600,307 866,900
N Moved Up 146,983 146,983 146,983 68,119 78,864
N Moved Down 122,895 122,895 122,895 64,469 58,426
N Moved Home 29,756 29,756 29,756 15,329 14,427
NOTES: The table reports the results for the mover-interacted coefficients from a regression of log earnings in the model (6). The regressions
include controls for education, experience, race, household structure, industry and occupation dummies (2-digit level). Source: Author’s
calculations using Census and IRS data as described in main text.
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many types of workers. A possible story emerges to explain simultaneously high in- and out-
mobility. More disperse income distributions and more volatile income processes generate
a wider degree of good matches attracting migrants and poor matches pushing them away.
At the same time, by offering superior human capital accumulation, higher mobility places
allow, at the margin, greater rates of inflow and outflow. These results motivate the study
of local labor markets according to their mobility status much like the literature has studied
the relationship between incomes and size.
More generally, the paper shows that spatial features of gross mobility should not be
ignored in the study of regional economies. The patterns documented here indicate that
local labor market features have implications for the rates of regional adjustment. Models of
local labor market adjustment typically focus on net migration, although empirically, such
adjustment occurs through a substantial degree of gross migration. With heterogenous rates
of excess mobility, the growth or decline of particular local labor markets would introduce
different productivity or welfare costs in the aggregate.
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A Appendix: Auxiliary Results
Table A1: Mobility Index: Gravity Regression Results
Index # 2 3 4 5
Gravity Gravity+LM Log Rate I.H.S.
Origin Size 0.8011 0.7538 0.3490
(0.0152)*** (0.0160)*** (0.0124)***
Dest. Size 0.5029 0.4999 0.5021 0.2179
(0.0153)*** (0.0160)*** (0.0153)*** (0.0124)***
Move -2.197 -2.189 -2.196 -1.733
(0.0130)*** (0.0130)*** (0.0130)*** (0.0148)***
Log Mile Distance -1.098 -1.098 -1.098 -1.256
(0.0013)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0011)***
College Share Diff. -1.850 -1.868 -1.850 -3.215
(0.0244)*** (0.0244)*** (0.0244)*** (0.0172)***
Industry Dissimilarity -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.034
(0.0008)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0006)***
Size Diff. -0.313 -0.314 -0.313 -0.502
(0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0010)***
Orig. Unempl. Rate 0.1983
(0.0065)***
Dest. Unempl. Rate -0.144
(0.0064)***
Orig. Wage -0.415
(0.0330)***
Dest. Wage 0.4291
(0.0334)***
Orig. Home Price 0.2591
(0.0110)***
Dest. Home Price -0.118
(0.0111)***
Cons -2.684 -2.022 -4.804 5.4607
(0.2329)*** (0.2472)*** (0.1665)*** (0.1897)***
K × J × T 581,847 581,847 581,847 1,714,167
NOTES: The table reports additional coefficients from the gravity regression model (1). Source: Author’s calculations using IRS data as
described in main text.
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Table A2: Mobility Index: Census Data Regression Results, Origin Side
Index # 7 8 12 13
Census 2000 ACS 2006-11
Demographics Demo. + Moved In Demographics Demo. + Moved In
Aged 30-39 -0.033 -0.037 -0.011 -0.012
(0.0006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Aged 40-49 -0.067 -0.073 -0.022 -0.024
(0.0006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Aged 50-59 -0.085 -0.095 -0.028 -0.030
(0.0006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Aged 20-29 x College 0.1252 0.1204 0.0400 0.0384
(0.0029)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0009)***
Aged 30-39 x College 0.0639 0.0598 0.0037 0.0021
(0.0015)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0007)***
Aged 40-49 x College -0.000 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007
(0.0014) (0.0014)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0007)***
Aged 50-59 x College -0.017 -0.020 -0.008 -0.009
(0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0007)***
Children, 1 -0.022 -0.021 -0.008 -0.007
(0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)***
Children, 2 -0.032 -0.031 -0.009 -0.009
(0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)***
Children, 3+ -0.031 -0.030 -0.009 -0.009
(0.0005)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Race/Eth., Black -0.016 -0.015 -0.001 0.0001
(0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)
Race/Eth., Hisp. -0.020 -0.013 -0.005 -0.004
(0.0006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Race/Eth., Asian 0.0141 0.0197 0.0043 0.0054
(0.0010)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0004)***
Race/Eth., Other 0.0448 0.0433 0.0046 0.0039
(0.0013)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0008)***
Married 0.0000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006
(0.0003) (0.0003)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)***
Immigrant -0.001 -0.060 -0.001 -0.018
(0.0006)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Citizen -0.017 -0.014 -0.004 -0.003
(0.0007)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
College Town 0.2205 0.1830 0.0712 0.0643
(0.0081)*** (0.0080)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0040)***
Not at Home 0.0888 0.0256
(0.0004)*** (0.0002)***
Cons 0.2375 0.2142 0.0904 0.0835
(0.0083)*** (0.0082)*** (0.0058)*** (0.0058)***
N 4,104,864 4,104,864 5,827,478 5,827,478
NOTES: The table reports additional coefficients from the census data mobility index model (2). Source: Author’s calculations using Census
data as described in main text.
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Table A3: Incomes Dynamics for Movers in PSID, by Origin and Destination Mobility
Years to Move Origin Destination
Mobile Immobile Mobile Immobile
-8 0.0966 -0.001
(0.0350)*** (0.0384)
-6 0.0591 -0.029
(0.0299)** (0.0414)
-4 0.0498 0.0368
(0.0256)* (0.0339)
-2 0.0072 -0.003
(0.0202) (0.0253)
2 -0.006 -0.053
(0.0221) (0.0268)**
4 0.0618 -0.054
(0.0248)** (0.0280)*
6 0.0695 -0.008
(0.0255)*** (0.0330)
8 0.0847 -0.035
(0.0277)*** (0.0319)
NOTES: The table reports coefficients and standard errors from the move event model (6); coefficients are plotted in Figure 2. N = 63, 564.
Source: Author’s calculations using Census and IRS data as described in main text.
B Appendix: Full List of MSAs by Mobility Index
Table B1: Reporting of Mobility Indices (Origin Side Only)
Rank Metro Area Out Migration Indices
(Gravity Index) Index: Ann. Rate Gravity Demo. Demo.+Moved-in Demo.
Data: IRS IRS Census 2000 Census 2000 ACS
Average 2.87
1 San Diego, CA 5.02 2.71 1.10 0.78 0.36
2 Lawton, OK 6.61 2.42
3 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 3.48 2.37 0.16 -0.01 -0.30
4 Phoenix, AZ 3.50 2.31 -0.28 -1.32 -0.27
5 Seattle-Everett, WA 3.14 2.27 -0.47 -0.98 -0.79
6 Las Vegas, NV 4.39 2.24 0.44 -0.82 0.34
7 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 4.96 1.98 1.20 1.13 0.28
8 Colorado Springs, CO 6.47 1.97 1.26
9 Salinas-Sea Side-Monterey, CA 6.21 1.87
10 San Angelo, TX 4.89 1.86
11 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 3.96 1.80 0.14 0.02 -0.27
12 Grand Forks, ND 3.63 1.79
13 Bremerton, WA 5.55 1.77 2.26 1.71 0.74
14 Miami-Hialeah, FL 3.15 1.75 -1.19 -1.93 -0.79
15 Great Falls, MT 2.87 1.70
16 Yuma, AZ 4.31 1.70 1.68 1.17 0.21
17 Fayetteville, NC 7.32 1.64 4.15 4.03 2.50
18 Cheyenne, WY 3.85 1.59
19 Wichita Falls, TX 4.62 1.57 1.90 1.90 1.37
20 Tucson, AZ 4.12 1.54 0.53 -0.26 -0.01
21 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 3.91 1.51 0.09 -0.90 0.00
22 San Jose, CA 5.58 1.49 1.71 1.73 0.33
23 Washington, DC 3.46 1.38 -0.15 -0.52 -0.60
24 Missoula, MT 3.23 1.37
25 Panama City, FL 4.53 1.36 2.37 1.82 1.82
26 Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN 5.34 1.35 2.96 2.49 1.73
27 Iowa City, IA 5.42 1.34 2.09 2.58 0.93
28 Rapid City, SD 2.51 1.33
29 Bradenton, FL 4.21 1.31 1.00
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30 Denver-Boulder-Longmont, CO 2.81 1.30 -2.32 -3.27 -2.42
31 Naples, FL 4.20 1.30 0.76 -0.44 0.71
32 Lawrence, KS 7.36 1.29
33 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 5.69 1.24 2.08 2.15 1.36
34 Gainesville, FL 6.79 1.24 2.59 2.55 3.45
35 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 2.89 1.23 -0.58 -0.88 -0.80
36 Melbourne-Titusville-Cocoa-Palm Bay, FL 4.29 1.22 0.93 -0.11 0.76
37 Flagstaff, AZ 6.14 1.21 1.83 1.47 1.65
38 Orlando, FL 4.66 1.16 0.82 -0.04 1.00
39 Lakeland-Winterhaven, FL 4.77 1.08 0.40 -0.19 0.93
40 Casper, WY 2.08 1.07
41 Bakersfield, CA 3.97 1.07 1.36 1.41 0.04
42 Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 5.16 1.06 1.66 1.62 0.69
43 Las Cruces, NM 3.64 1.05 1.23 1.16 0.13
44 Reno, NV 4.05 1.02 1.25 0.22 0.07
45 Pensacola, FL 4.81 1.01 1.17 0.46 1.35
46 Abilene, TX 4.49 0.99 1.69 1.94 2.13
47 Provo-Orem, UT 5.55 0.97 1.34 1.30 0.91
48 Santa Fe, NM 4.38 0.97 1.59 1.19 1.17
49 Austin, TX 4.53 0.95 0.49 0.40 -0.29
50 Myrtle Beach, SC 4.12 0.93 -0.05 -0.54 -0.10
51 Olympia, WA 4.69 0.88 1.03 0.63 0.61
52 Bryan-College Station, TX 6.61 0.88 2.76 3.25 3.27
53 McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr-Mission, TX 2.89 0.87 -0.08 -0.02 -0.52
54 State College, PA 4.19 0.84 -0.06 0.56 0.48
55 San Antonio, TX 3.21 0.83 0.37 0.41 -0.18
56 Spokane, WA 3.12 0.78 0.06 -0.33 -0.51
57 Houston-Brazoria, TX 2.58 0.78 -0.68 -0.90 -0.79
58 Portland-Vancouver, OR 2.54 0.77 -0.52 -1.13 -0.84
59 Sumter, SC 3.62 0.76 0.91 0.96 1.63
60 Sacramento, CA 3.42 0.76 0.05 -0.02 -0.03
61 Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 3.51 0.75 0.75 0.92 0.14
62 Lubbock, TX 4.67 0.74 1.50 1.93 1.29
63 Columbia, MO 3.94 0.74 0.32 0.40 0.09
64 Ocala, FL 3.85 0.70 0.64 -0.13 0.75
65 Odessa, TX 3.21 0.69 1.18 1.36 -0.07
66 Albuquerque, NM 3.29 0.69 0.72 0.27 -0.26
67 New York-Northeastern NJ, NY 2.09 0.66 -1.16 -0.93 -1.04
68 Boston, MA 3.18 0.66 -1.27 -1.10 -0.77
69 Eugene-Springfield, OR 3.71 0.66 0.21 -0.36 0.16
70 Merced, CA 4.96 0.65 1.38 1.51 0.68
71 Bloomington, IN 4.64 0.63 1.64 2.08 2.24
72 Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL 4.67 0.61 0.93 1.30 1.19
73 Jacksonville, FL 3.54 0.61 -0.12
74 San Luis Obispo-Atascad-P Robles, CA 5.25 0.59 2.13 2.43 1.68
75 Victoria, TX 2.82 0.58
76 Bellingham, WA 3.85 0.55 0.45 0.25 -0.37
77 Atlanta, GA 2.59 0.55 -0.49 -1.05 -0.61
78 Chicago-Gary-Lake, IL 2.07 0.55 -1.00 -0.96 -1.12
79 Santa Cruz, CA 5.67 0.54 1.80 1.92 1.67
80 Fargo-Morehead, ND 2.57 0.54 0.03 -0.09 -1.17
81 Amarillo, TX 2.60 0.52 0.64 0.66 0.21
82 Billings, MT 1.94 0.51 -0.41 -0.71 -1.62
83 Pascagoula-Moss Point, MS 3.84 0.51 0.86 0.65 1.15
84 Redding, CA 3.28 0.50 0.40 0.53 -0.23
85 Norfolk-VA Beach-Portsmouth, VA 3.69 0.49 1.39 1.01 0.25
86 Bangor, ME 2.00 0.47
87 Corpus Christi, TX 4.09 0.47
88 New London-Norwich, CT 4.49 0.46
89 Tallahassee, FL 4.77 0.46 1.11 1.01 1.47
90 Lafayette-W. Lafayette, IN 4.17 0.44 1.00 1.35 0.86
91 Burlington, VT 2.17 0.40
92 Fresno, CA 3.21 0.39 0.36 0.45 -0.57
93 Laredo, TX 2.33 0.38 0.04 0.20 -0.58
94 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 2.59 0.37 -0.20 -0.36 -0.64
95 Bismarck, ND 1.68 0.37
96 Savannah, GA 3.48 0.36 1.46 1.49 1.14
97 Charleston-N.Charleston, SC 3.94 0.35 0.66 0.46 0.36
98 Grand Junction, CO 2.77 0.35
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99 Chico, CA 4.48 0.31 1.06 1.26 1.03
100 Stockton, CA 4.79 0.29 0.92 1.06 0.75
101 Sioux City, IA 1.85 0.29 -0.09 0.09 -0.49
102 Medford, OR 2.99 0.28 -0.20 -1.15 0.27
103 Goldsboro, NC 3.24 0.28 0.41 0.54 -0.70
104 Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 2.88 0.25 0.88 0.36 -0.52
105 Lincoln, NE 3.13 0.25 -0.17 0.02 -1.03
106 Bridgeport, CT 4.63 0.23 0.15 -0.23 -0.28
107 Columbus, GA 4.29 0.23 0.99 0.76 0.96
108 Bloomington-Normal, IL 4.04 0.21 0.22 0.59 0.32
109 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 3.55 0.21 0.68 0.79 -0.31
110 Pine Bluff, AR 2.54 0.18
111 Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 3.88 0.17 -0.33 -0.26 0.07
112 Sioux Falls, SD 1.91 0.13
113 Manchester, NH 4.37 0.11 -0.98 -1.25 0.37
114 Modesto, CA 4.34 0.11 0.68 0.82 0.80
115 Dubuque, IA 1.80 0.11
116 Charlottesville, VA 3.21 0.11 1.07 1.02 1.41
117 Yakima, WA 2.96 0.11 0.50 0.36 -0.29
118 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 3.87 0.09 0.49 0.56 0.47
119 Eau Claire, WI 1.98 0.08 -1.07 -0.83 -0.76
120 Portland, ME 2.83 0.04 -1.51 -1.65 -0.98
121 Athens, GA 4.27 0.01 1.68 1.90 1.83
122 Durham, NC 3.47 0.01 -0.06 -0.27 -0.40
123 Madison, WI 3.30 0.00 -0.43 -0.23 -0.45
124 Waco, TX 3.49 0.00 0.85 1.17 0.45
125 Dover, DE 2.74 0.00 0.53 0.07 0.26
126 LaCrosse, WI 1.97 -0.02 -0.56 -0.31 -0.55
127 Boise City, ID 2.02 -0.02 -0.69 -1.45 -0.50
128 Wausau, WI 1.65 -0.03 -1.22 -0.85 -1.58
129 Greenville, NC 3.24 -0.05 0.54 0.91 0.85
130 Steubenville-Weirton, WV 1.42 -0.09
131 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 1.57 -0.10 -1.51 -1.54 -1.44
132 Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 2.49 -0.10 -0.02 -0.61 -0.61
133 Omaha, NE 2.36 -0.10 -0.65 -0.93 -0.86
134 Joplin, MO 1.90 -0.11 -0.55 -0.86 -0.47
135 Sherman-Denison, TX 3.41 -0.12
136 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 2.02 -0.13 -0.45 -0.03 -0.51
137 Decatur, IL 2.23 -0.14 -0.22 0.10 -0.56
138 Danville, VA 1.22 -0.18 -1.17 -0.84 0.06
139 Muncie, IN 3.25 -0.18 -0.12 0.23 0.55
140 Florence, AL 1.35 -0.19 -1.03 -0.86 -0.54
141 Tyler, TX 3.72 -0.20 0.08 0.25 0.02
142 New Orleans, LA 3.63 -0.20 -0.49 -0.21 2.00
143 Detroit, MI 1.95 -0.20 -1.39 -1.18 -0.88
144 Mobile, AL 2.58 -0.20 -0.51 -0.48 -0.45
145 Elkhart-Goshen, IN 2.83 -0.20 -0.46 -0.56 0.02
146 Monroe, LA 2.18 -0.22 0.21 0.61 -0.01
147 Texarkana, TX 1.84 -0.23
148 Jackson, MI 2.63 -0.24 -0.06 0.45 0.74
149 Oklahoma City, OK 2.38 -0.24 0.41 0.23
150 Salem, OR 3.40 -0.26 0.60 0.20 -0.17
151 Shreveport, LA 2.44 -0.27 0.08 0.17 -0.16
152 Erie, PA 1.96 -0.27 -0.86 -0.44 -1.06
153 Wichita, KS 2.32 -0.28 -0.39 -0.50 -0.87
154 Philadelphia, PA 2.18 -0.28 -1.06 -0.96 -0.97
155 Poughkeepsie, NY 3.65 -0.29
156 Gadsden, AL 2.12 -0.30 -0.60 -0.20 -0.96
157 Lima, OH 1.56 -0.32 -0.86 -0.40 -0.29
158 Jackson, TN 1.74 -0.33 -0.46 -0.31 -0.62
159 Janesville-Beloit, WI 2.61 -0.34 -0.33 -0.19 -0.25
160 Kankakee, IL 2.63 -0.34 0.20 0.57 -0.09
161 Sheboygan, WI 2.09 -0.34 -1.33 -0.93 -0.75
162 Lewiston-Auburn, ME 2.60 -0.35
163 Anniston, AL 2.65 -0.36 0.16 0.36 0.24
164 Memphis, TN 2.21 -0.37 -0.23 -0.55 -0.71
165 Cumberland, MD 0.83 -0.38
166 Rochester, MN 2.41 -0.39 0.25 0.17 -0.40
167 Pittsfield, MA 2.34 -0.39
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168 Wilmington, NC 3.08 -0.39 0.63 0.47 0.21
169 Binghamton, NY 2.26 -0.41 0.47 0.89 -0.78
170 Lake Charles, LA 2.35 -0.42 -0.02 0.31 0.15
171 Des Moines, IA 2.07 -0.42 -0.27 -0.06 -0.95
172 Alexandria, LA 2.09 -0.43 -0.70 -0.39 -0.50
173 New Haven, CT 3.91 -0.43 -0.19 -0.10 0.20
174 Baltimore, MD 2.79 -0.45 -0.61 -0.68 -0.68
175 Kansas City, MO 2.11 -0.45 -0.84 -1.28 -0.85
176 Flint, MI 3.08 -0.45
177 Pueblo, CO 2.54 -0.46
178 Worcester, MA 3.70 -0.46 -0.25 0.08 -0.22
179 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN 3.14 -0.49 0.18 0.32 0.18
180 Lafayette, LA 2.50 -0.49 -0.30 0.15 -0.13
181 Racine, WI 3.44 -0.49 0.24 0.52 -0.13
182 Tulsa, OK 2.38 -0.49 0.55 0.30
183 Hattiesburg, MS 2.45 -0.51 -0.18 -0.01 -0.05
184 Duluth-Superior, MN 1.86 -0.52 -0.77 -0.42 -0.48
185 Utica-Rome, NY 2.32 -0.52 -0.05 0.58 -0.70
186 Elmira, NY 1.36 -0.53
187 Lexington-Fayette, KY 2.26 -0.53 0.33 0.42 -0.16
188 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC 2.73 -0.53 -0.66 -0.92 -0.56
189 Longview-Marshall, TX 2.65 -0.54 0.47 0.57 -0.19
190 Columbus, OH 2.35 -0.54 -0.82 -0.71 -0.90
191 Mansfield, OH 1.82 -0.54 -0.89 -0.67 -0.56
192 Tuscaloosa, AL 2.72 -0.56 -0.47 -0.17 0.06
193 Hartford-Bristol-Middleton-New Britain, CT 2.95 -0.57 -0.92 -1.00 -0.96
194 Augusta-Aiken, GA 2.43 -0.58 0.42 0.08 0.11
195 Springfield, IL 2.26 -0.59
196 Auburn-Opelika, AL 3.08 -0.62 0.02 0.11 -0.18
197 Springfield, MO 2.05 -0.62 -0.36 -0.55 -0.41
198 Nashville, TN 2.13 -0.63 -0.68 -0.97 -0.78
199 Columbia, SC 2.89 -0.63 0.06 -0.01 -0.24
200 Syracuse, NY 2.47 -0.65 -0.48 0.03 -0.56
201 Kokomo, IN 2.18 -0.65 -0.45 -0.21 0.53
202 Lansing-E. Lansing, MI 3.61 -0.67 0.21 0.67 0.89
203 Houma-Thibodoux, LA 1.62 -0.68 -0.97 -0.45 -0.75
204 Cedar Rapids, IA 2.36 -0.68 -0.18 0.06 -0.57
205 Johnstown, PA 1.61 -0.70 -0.97 -0.34 -0.54
206 Dothan, AL 1.35 -0.71 0.59 0.50 -0.86
207 Terre Haute, IN 2.02 -0.73 -0.59 -0.30 -0.36
208 Fort Wayne, IN 2.08 -0.75 -0.75 -0.67 -0.67
209 Macon-Warner Robins, GA 2.20 -0.76 0.08 0.16 -0.30
210 Rochester, NY 2.00 -0.77 -0.75 -0.37 -0.76
211 Owensboro, KY 0.96 -0.77
212 St. Louis, MO 1.58 -0.78 -1.14 -1.10 -1.22
213 Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 2.11 -0.79 -0.59 -0.66 -0.82
214 Vineland-Milville-Bridgetown, NJ 2.81 -0.80 0.47 0.70 0.08
215 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 1.89 -0.80 -0.84 -0.29 -0.98
216 Decatur, AL 2.13 -0.81 -0.86 -1.02 -0.45
217 Rockford, IL 2.48 -0.82 -0.40 -0.43 -0.16
218 Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA 1.81 -0.83 -0.93 -1.07 -1.48
219 St. Joseph, MO 1.95 -0.88 -0.28 -0.05 -0.63
220 Baton Rouge, LA 2.23 -0.89 -0.69 -0.43 -0.66
221 Topeka, KS 2.25 -0.89 0.06 0.10 -0.54
222 Williamsport, PA 1.23 -0.89 -1.03 -0.48 -1.09
223 Milwaukee, WI 2.15 -0.90 -0.92 -0.73 -0.94
224 Battle Creek, MI 2.88 -0.90 -0.33 -0.07 -0.21
225 Atlantic City, NJ 3.45 -0.93 0.06 -0.20 0.13
226 Indianapolis, IN 2.03 -0.93 -0.94 -0.90 -0.75
227 Springfield, OH 2.52 -0.98 -0.29 -0.14 -0.37
228 Albany, GA 1.72 -1.00 0.53 0.75 0.24
229 Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange, TX 2.75 -1.00 0.04 0.22 0.48
230 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 1.69 -1.01 -0.91 -0.48 -0.99
231 Knoxville, TN 1.94 -1.01 -0.84 -0.85 -1.07
232 Cleveland, OH 2.16 -1.03 -0.97 -0.73 -0.79
233 York, PA 2.74 -1.04 -0.58 -0.39 -0.54
234 Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley, PA 1.56 -1.05 -1.51 -1.04 -1.33
235 Springfield-Holyoke-Chicopee, MA 2.59 -1.09 -1.20 -1.10 -1.02
236 Birmingham, AL 1.98 -1.14 -0.82 -0.59 -0.47
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237 Providence-Fall River-Pawtucket, RI 2.42 -1.17 -1.46 -1.33 -0.61
238 Altoona, PA 1.37 -1.17 -1.26 -0.66 -0.87
239 Toledo, OH 1.92 -1.18 -0.50 -0.20 -0.54
240 Green Bay, WI 1.91 -1.18 -0.76 -0.37 -0.40
241 Asheville, NC 1.91 -1.19 -0.53 -0.63 -0.11
242 Charleston, WV 1.34 -1.19
243 Wheeling, WV 1.12 -1.20
244 Lancaster, PA 2.61 -1.21 -0.54 -0.17 -0.40
245 Akron, OH 2.36 -1.22 -0.69 -0.34 -0.59
246 Appleton-Oskosh-Neenah, WI 1.95 -1.23 -1.17 -0.79 -0.77
247 Richmond-Petersburg, VA 1.98 -1.23 0.74 0.74 1.58
248 Grand Rapids, MI 1.90 -1.23 -1.26 -0.97 -0.82
249 Jackson, MS 1.55 -1.29 -0.95 -0.68 -0.41
250 Burlington, NC 2.10 -1.29 -0.82 -0.82 -0.72
251 Reading, PA 2.82 -1.29 -0.61 -0.18 -0.28
252 Fort Smith, AR 1.36 -1.30 -0.77 -1.15 -0.23
253 Cincinnati, OH 1.72 -1.31 -0.86 -0.76 -0.64
254 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 1.76 -1.33 -0.87 -0.41 -0.79
255 Peoria, IL 1.75 -1.42 -0.84 -0.55 -0.58
256 Parkersburg-Marietta, WV 0.75 -1.44
257 Chattanooga, TN 1.55 -1.44 -2.74 -3.19 -2.02
258 Youngstown-Warren, OH 1.78 -1.48 -0.98 -0.73 -0.60
259 Louisville, KY 1.30 -1.50 -1.14 -1.11 -1.38
260 Evansville, IN 1.02 -1.52 -1.25 -1.19 -0.97
261 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 2.33 -1.54 -0.26 0.16 -0.40
262 Rocky Mount, NC 1.98 -1.58
263 Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 1.66 -1.63 -1.19 -1.29 -0.81
264 Florence, SC 1.75 -1.70
265 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 2.42 -1.78 -0.62 -0.40 -0.40
266 Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 1.40 -1.81 -1.63 -1.20 -1.35
267 Hagerstown, MD 1.86 -1.86 -0.50 -0.62 -0.14
268 Huntington-Ashland, WV 1.05 -1.94
269 Hickory-Morgantown, NC 1.10 -1.97 -1.46 -1.29 -0.85
270 Lynchburg, VA 1.53 -2.01 -0.73 -0.55 -0.29
271 Roanoke, VA 1.50 -2.02
272 Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN 0.70 -2.44 -1.46 -1.65 -0.96
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